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Equalization effects of local financing models in Portugal 
 
One objective frequently found in models of decentralized financing is that of 
equalization. The concern is that poorer jurisdictions receive enough resources 
for basic services and for development promotion, thus eliminating horizontal 
and vertical imbalances. In Portugal, decentralization has occurred at two 
levels: the local, for the whole country and the regional for the autonomous 
regions of the Azores and Madeira. Decentralization to local governments has 
undergone several changes in recent decades. The current paper focuses on 
testing for the presence of an equalization effect in the models adopted to 
finance municipalities in Portugal, since the nineteen nineties. Using the 
theoretical background that maintains that for the presence of an equalizing 
effect it is necessary that, on a per capita basis, poorer regions or localities 
receive relatively more transfers than the richer jurisdictions, a test is made 
using a data set that includes all municipalities of Portugal. The situation of the 
two autonomous regions is controlled with dummy variables. The hypothesis 
that the models used have an equalizing effect is tested through the sign of the 
coefficient of the regression of per capita transfers on per capita own resources. 
In the presence of an equalizing effect the sign will be significant and negative. 
It is confirmed that, for the period under analysis, the municipalities with lower 
per capita own revenues are those that receive more transfers per capita. There 
is, therefore, an equalizing effect in the current transfer system to municipalities. 
Using pooled data, one can also conclude that the equalization effect has 
become stronger with the 1998 and 2002 reviews of the system, when 
compared to the system in effect in 1991. 
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services and for development promotion, thus eliminating horizontal and vertical 
imbalances. In Portugal, decentralization has occurred at two levels: the local, for the 
whole country and the regional for the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira. 
Decentralization to local governments has undergone several changes in recent decades. 
The current paper focuses on testing for the presence of an equalization effect in the 
models adopted to finance municipalities in Portugal, since the nineteen nineties. Using 
the theoretical background that maintains that for the presence of an equalizing effect it 
is necessary that, on a per capita basis, poorer regions or localities receive relatively 
more transfers than the richer jurisdictions, a test is made using a data set that includes 
all municipalities of Portugal. The situation of the two autonomous regions is controlled 
with dummy variables. The hypothesis that the models used have an equalizing effect is 
tested through the sign of the coefficient of the regression of per capita transfers on per 
capita own resources. In the presence of an equalizing effect the sign will be significant 
and negative. It is confirmed that, for the period under analysis, the municipalities with 
lower per capita own revenues are those that receive more transfers per capita. There is, 
therefore, an equalizing effect in the current transfer system to municipalities. Using 
pooled data, one can also conclude that the equalization effect has become stronger with 
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1 – Introduction 
Fiscal, administrative and political decentralization has been a common 
characteristic of the reforms undertaken in a variety of countries in the last few decades 
(Ahmad and Tanzi (2002), Mackintosh and Roy, 1999; Roy, 1999; Oats, 1998; Ahmad 
and Ravi, 1997, Berkowitz, Daniel and Wei Li (1997)). Decentralization has been 
advocated by different interest groups, reacting to highly centralized regimes, and by 
influential international organizations like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Ahmad e Tanzi, 2002). Subjacent to these proposals is the conviction 
that there are benefits to be obtained from a decentralized organization of government 
or that decentralization can be more advantageous if well planned. 
Decentralization is, however, invariably associated to vertical and horizontal 
imbalances. These imbalances lead to the immediate need to devise some system of 
transfers that eliminates them. Transfer systems, though, are not always successful in 
attaining these objectives. 
In Portugal, decentralization has occurred, in recent decades, at two levels: on 
the one hand, two autonomous regions were crated for the archipelagos of the Azores 
and Madeira; on the other hand, improvements were introduced in the financing model 
of local governments. Regionalization of the whole country was planned but was not 
approved in a referendum. 
The purpose of the current paper is to focus on the characteristics of local 
government financing and, in particular, to test whether or not the system incorporates 
an equalizing effect. The test is undertaken at three different time periods, coinciding 
with the implementation of an equal number of reforms. Particular attention is given to 
the local effects in the autonomous regions of the Azores and of Madeira. 
In what follows, the next section reviews the main characteristics of the model 
of local government financing in Portugal. Section three reviews some of the models 
used to analyse local government financing and specifies the model that will be tested in 
this exercise. Section four presents the data used, the results of estimation and the 
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2. Local government financing in Portugal 
 
The economic development of the industrial societies had enormous 
consequences on the role of the State. It created new social needs, helped the 
development of a new social conscience and a more critical public opinion and made 
more evident the need for a reformed public administration to respond to a new setting 
and new needs, socially more complex and technologically more sophisticated 
(Montalvo, 1999). 
In Portugal, there was a tendency favourable to a self-limiting central 
administration and to the intervention of the private sector and of regional and local 
levels of government. The general tendency of reforms was to attribute to central 
authorities the role of planning and coordination, leaving to more decentralized levels of 
government the technical and bureaucratic functions that were to be retained in the 
public sector (Sousa Franco, 2001). 
The main thrust of the reforms, on the one hand, rejected the model of a 
welfare state, national economic intervention and centralized burocracy, 
highlighting, on the other hand, the virtues of regional and local authorities 
(Amaral, 1988).  
Before 1974, local government revenues came from two sources: own 
revenuesand central administration transfers and subsidies3. The main characteristics of 
these transfers and subsidies were their randomness, discretionary nature and lack of 
transparency, reinforcing the dependency of local governments relative to central 
governments. 
In the constitutional review of 19764 it is determined that local governments 
should have their own assets and finances and that transfers to local governments should 
aim to correct asymmetries between jurisdictions. Own revenues should include those 
that derive from the management of assets and from fees and charges from the provision 
of services. In this constitutional review local governments are also attributed some 
fiscal powers. Financial autonomy was thus constitutionally established leaving to 
regulatory decrees the establishment of the local government financing rules.  
                                                 
3 In the 1940 administrative code own revenues comprised direct and indirect taxes, revenue from own assets, fees, fines and other 
municipal revenues. 
4 Article 239º of the constitution (Lei Constitucional  n.º 1/97, of September 20, fourth constitutional review.). 
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Since the 1976 Constitution was published, four alterations were made to the 
local financing regime. 
The first regime was established in 19795. Financing of local governments 
changed from ad-oc procedures and negotiation to become dependent on municipal 
plans and on autonomous decisions of the local authorities. 
The subsequent reviews of the law occurred in 1984, 1987 and 19986. These new 
versions of the law introduced a formula based transfer scheme. 
The main problem in decentralized forms of government is still the 
determination of the responsibilities and resources that are attributed to each level of 
government in order to avoid vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
Vertical imbalances occur when, at a certain level of government, revenues are 
not balanced with expenditure responsibilities. 
Horizontal imbalances occur when, at the same level of government, there are 
different jurisdictions have different fiscal capacities due to differences in their fiscal 
potential, differences in expenditure needs and differences in the cost of provision of 
services. 
A common objective of intergovernmental transfers is to guarantee a certain 
level of territorial equity by assuring that citizens, independently of where they live, will 
have access to a determinate set of services (Pereira, 1998). 
Transfers might also be integrated in a strategy to gain more efficiency when it 
is believed that lower levels of government can better provide some of the services 
involved.  
Among the different types of transfers those that better fit the decentralization 
purpose are unconditional transfers. The majority of transfers to local governments fit 
into this category. 
Currently, the most important revenue sources for local governments are the 
own revenues and transfers from the national budget as a share of taxes collected by the 
central authorities.  
Own revenue sources come mostly from taxes (property) and fees from 
municipal services. 
 Revenues can be represented in the following way: 
(1) MiPiTi TRRR +=  
                                                 
5 First local finance law – Lei n.º 1/79, of January 2. 
6 Decreto- Lei n.º 98/84, of March 29 ; Lei n.º 1/87, of January  6 and; Local finance law – Lei n.º 42/98, of August 6. 
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where 
TiR  represents total revenue of municipality i, 
PiR   represents own revenues of municipality i and 
MiTR  represents transfers from the national budget to municipality i. 
 
Own revenues can be represented by the following expression:  
(2) ∑∑ == += iMm iiij ijijPi qmpmBtR 11 *  
where 
j  represents the index of the municipal taxes, 
i
jB  represents the tax base of local taxes j (j=1,2....j), 
i
jt  represents the rate applied by municipality i to the base j, 
iM  represents the number of services sold by municipality I, 
iqm  represents the volume of services sold; 
ipm  represents the unit cost of each service. 
 
The budgets of local governments are, thus financed by own revenues, credit and 
transfers. The transfers themselves are attributed trough three different funds: FBM 
(Municipal Base Fund), FGM (General Municipal Fund) and FCM (Municipal Cohesion 
Fund). 
 The Municipal Base Fund is meant to provide municipalities with basic 
financing for its operations and is equally distributed among all of them. 
 The General Municipal Fund seeks to provide municipalities with the necessary 
financing associated to operations and investment. It is initially dived among three 
regions: mainland Portugal; the Autonomous Region of the Azores and; the 
Autonomous Region of Madeira. The distribution factors are population, the number of 
municipalities on each group and the land area covered. 
The Municipal Cohesion Fund is meant to correct asymmetries in favour of the 
less developed areas. It is distributed on the basis of an index of fiscal need and of an 
index of disparity of opportunities. Fiscal need is assessed on the basis of the difference 
between average national potential per capita revenue and standard potential per capita 
revenue for each municipality, with respect to property taxes, motor vehicle taxes and 
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property sales taxes. The index of disparity of opportunities takes into account access to 
health services, comfort factors, basic sanitation and acquisition of knowledge.   
 Analysis of the factors that determine the distribution of the funds budgeted for 
local government support would suggest a strong equalizing effect given that, in various 
instances, the distribution is made on the basis of average values. This approach will 
strongly benefit those municipalities that are less capable of generating their own 
resources. In addition, the transfers from the Municipal Cohesion Fund are based on an 
index of fiscal need that should benefit the municipalities that are less capable of 
generating the necessary funds for development. 
 Given its configuration, this system is a partial equalization approach since it 
focuses, almost exclusively, on revenue sharing without taking into direct account cost 
factors. Land area, population and the fiscal need index might achieve that purpose but 
only indirectly. 
 A full equalization approach to determine transfer schemes is suggested by 
Ahmad and Thomas (1997). The authors present a formula that starts by looking at 
standard revenue and standard expenditures. Standardized revenue is determined in 
accordance with the potential tax base and the national tax rates. Standardized 
expenditures are determined in accor4dance with national per capita standards with or 
without correction factors.  
Transfers that, simultaneously, eliminate horizontal and vertical imbalances are 
given by the difference between standardized revenue and standardized expenditures. 
  
 
3 – Testing for Equalization Effects 
 
 It is possible to identify almost as many variants of transfer formulae as there are 
countries that adopt decentralized regional or local government financing models. It is 
possible, using fairly simple models, to test the equalization impact of each system. 
 In an application to China, the World Bank (2000) regresses per capita transfers 
on per capita GDP. The regression used transfers per capita for each of the 31 provinces 
as the dependent variable and per capita GDP as the independent variable. The model 
was the following:  
  
  Tpci = ao + a1GDPpci + εi , 
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where Tpci is transfers per capita for province i, 
          GDPpci  is gross domestic product  per capita for province i and  
           εi  is the error term. 
The presence of a significant equalizing effect requires that coefficient a1 be 
negative and significant. This means that the lower the GDP per capita the greater, other 
things being equal, the transfers should be. 
 Using 1994 data, the application of this model provided the following results: 
 
Tpci = 206,46 –0,97GDPpci 
                                     (1,93)   (-0,075) 
Values in parenthesis are t statistics and R2=0,0002.  
From these results it is concluded that there is no relationship between the 
transfers to each province and its respective need, measured by per capita GDP. A test 
using 2000 data leads to the same conclusion. 
Assuming that promoting fiscal equalization is an objective, Hayo e Wrede (2001)7 
formulate an axiomatic approach from which one can develop tests of a particular 
transfer system. 
The authors assume that the evaluation can be made with the net contribution as 
the dependent variable and an indicator of need and GDP as explanatory variables. 
In their model, Hayo e Wrede (2001)8, assume that the elimination of fiscal disequilibria 
occur in n jurisdictions, where n≥3. Each jurisdiction has gross revenues Yi, 
expenditures Ei and population Zi, where Y,E and Z ≥0.  Net revenue, Fi, of each 
jurisdiction depends on gross revenue, expenditure and the population of the n 
jurisdictions. 
The model was used to test the redistribution impact of EU policies. 
Using per capita data on the net contribution of each country to the European 
Union (EU) budget, each country’s GDP (GDPit), aggregate GDP (GDPt) and the 
weight of agriculture as a proxy for need (AGRit and AGRt), the authors verify if the 
redistribution policy of the EU is in accordance with the model. The isolating 
monotonic equalization is assumed to derive an explicit functional form for the test. 
The net income function can be written as follows: 
                                                 
 
8 This paper is, itself, inspired in the work of Buhl and Pfingsten (1990) and Aczel and Pfingsten (1993) 
who also start from an axiomatic approach to the problem. 
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   Fi = Yi – Ei - Ti , 
where  Ti = (1-c)Yi – (1-d)Ei + fzi   e  f = (1-d)E – (1-c)Y, 
 Fi  is net revenue, 
Yi  is gross revenue, 
Ei  is expenditure, 
zi   is population and 
Ti is the net contribution o jurisdiction i to the equalization fund.  
 
Dividing Ti by the population we get the per capita values 
 
ti = (1-c)yi – (1-d)ei + g, 
 
where g = (1-d)e –(1-c)y, with the lower case variables representing per capita values. 
In other words, net EU contributions depend on gross national product, on the aggregate 
product of the EU, on the expenditures of each country and on the expenditures of the 
EU. 
The model effectively estimated was the following:  
 CLit =   β1GDPit  + β2GDPt + β3AGRit + β4AGRt + εit, 
 
where, CL is net contribution, E(εit) = 0, Var εit= σ2, i is the country index and t is the 
time index.  
In another version of the model, after confirming that β1=-β2 and β3=-β4, a new 
specification was estimated: 
 
CLit =   β1 (GDPit -GDPt) + β3 (AGRit -AGRt) + εit, 
 
where εit= ui+vit, ui being an invariant country specific non observable effect and vit 
being the residual. 
 
With this application the authors conclude that, for the various specifications, the 
coefficients have the expected signs and are significant. The bigger the weight of 
agriculture relative to the EU average the lower the contribution of the country to the 
EU and, the smaller the difference of GDP to the EU average the greater the 
contribution to the EU budget.   
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In the current paper, a similar approach is used which considers per capita 
transfers to municipalities as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are per 
capita revenues, for all situations tested, and per capita GDP for each municipality in 
some versions of the model. 
Per capita transfers are considered, in this case, to be a proxy of net 
contributions whereas per capita own revenue is an indicator of need, as might be per 
capita GDP. The model tested was  
 
 TRSit= α0 + α1ORit + α2GDPit 
where  
- TRS represents transfers to each municipality, 
- OR represents own revenues, 
- GDP is an indicator of GDP for each municipality and  
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4 – Data and Results 
 
To test the model proposed in the previous section, data was collected on own 
revenue and transfers for each municipality for 1991, 1998 and 20029. The choice of 
dates for the collection of data was determined by the moment of introduction of 
changes in the transfer system.  
Observations were registered for 304 municipalities. Minor adjustments were made 
for situations associated to the creation of new municipalities. One municipality in the 
Azores was eliminated due to its atypical characteristics: it has a population of only 400 
people, leading to an unusual level of per capita transfers. Elimination of this 
municipality improved the fit of the regressions but did not change the main results. 
In addition to the own revenue and transfers for each of the three years referred, a 
proxy of GDP was obtained for 199810. The proxy was calculated multiplying an index 
of municipal purchasing power by the per capita GDP for the country. To calculate per 
capita values population statistics were obtained from the population census11. 
Two major sets of regressions were run: one using the pooled data and the other 
using annual data. For each set various dummies were tested.  
The dummies used when testing the model with pooled data controlled for the 
year and tested for differences in the two autonomous regions of the Azores and of 
Madeira. 
The dummies for the yearly data tested for regional differences.  
Table 1 presents the results obtained. 
The explanatory power of the model is low in all versions tested, even though 
the regressions are significant.  
From all regressions one concludes, looking at the coefficient for the DAcores 
dummy, that base transfers to the Azores are significantly higher than transfers for the 
rest of the country or Madeira. There is no significant difference from the national 
average in the case of Madeira.  
Using the pooled data, one concludes that there is a significant negative 
relationship between transfers and own per capita revenues. This relationship is 
                                                 
9 Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais. Finanças Municipais (issues 1988/2000) 
10 INE – National Accounts ; Indicador de Poder de Compra Concelhio (Municipal purchasing power 
indicator) 
11 INE – Census –19981/1991/2001  
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significantly stronger when we consider the case of the Azores. The same does not 
happen for Madeira.  
Controlling for the several time periods one also concludes that this negative 
relationship is stronger after the 1998 and 2002 revisions of the system. 
Looking at each year individually, one finds that, in 1991, the relationship 
between transfers and own revenues was negative but not significant whereas in 1998 
and 2002 it was negative and significant, suggesting that the system became more 
equalizing. The equalizing effect was significantly stronger for the Azores in 1991.  
These results are consistent with those obtained with the pooled data when 
controlling for each time period. 
  
TABLE 1 - Regression Results     
Models 
ANOS Pooled 1991 1998 2002 1998 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 29,072 25,387 47,253 56,36 67,579 62,106 
  18,2 15,4 19,2 19,6 22,5 21,9 
RECpc -0,312 -0,88 -0,522 -0,561 0,322   
  -5,4 -1,1 -5,4 -5,9 2,6   
D2000 22,934          
  13,0          
D1998 14,769          
  8,5          
DMadeira -0,0556 -1,228 -4,815 2,418 -10,996 -19,02 
  -0,1 -0,2 -0,4 0,2 -1,1 -1,3 
DAçores 32,023 61,668 23,347 36,713 29,646 9,174 
  3,9 4,7 1,3 1,7 1,9 0,5 
RECD2000 -0,0000014          
  -4,2          
RECD1998 -0,000001          
  -3,0          
PIB98        -0,276 -0,223 
         -9,7 -10,9 
RecAçores -3,001 -8,82 -2,154 -3,436 -2,4 0,0 
  -3,1 -3,7 -1,1 -1,5 -1,4 -0,2 
RecMad -0,291 -0,018 -0,114 -0,458 0,6 0,1 
  -0,71 0,0 -0,1 -0,6 0,9 1,0 
             
R2 0,204 0,09 0,093 0,115 0,307 0,29 
F 27,38 7,012 7,182 8,893 23,408 25,76 
sign. F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Highlighted values are significant at the 5% level    
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Introducing GDP as an explanatory variable, only for data relative to 1998, 
changed the results significantly. The relationship between transfers and GDP is 
negative and significant but the relationship between transfers and own revenues 
become positive and significant, when we used both variables. This means that we are 
in the presence of multicolinearity, which is consistent with a correlation coefficient of 
.725 between the two variables. 
Eliminating the own revenue variable from this regression yields a model with 
an equivalent explanatory power with GDP exhibiting a negative and significant sign. 




5 – Conclusion and Remarks 
 
Transfers from the central government to municipalities exhibit a significant 
equalizing effect in Portugal, in the period between 1991 and 2002. 
The transfer system redistributes 35% of the centralized revenues from the main 
taxes (corporate, personal and sales) and is comprised of a fixed amount that is equal for 
all municipalities (FMB – Municipal Base Fund), a component that depends on 
population and on the land area of the municipality (FGM – General Municipal Fund) 
and, finally, a component that is based on an estimate of need associated to revenue 
capacity and to the quality of services in the area (FCM -Municipal Cohesion Fund). 
Since a substantial portion of the funds transferred are calculated on a per capita 
basis, a strong equalizing effect is to be expected. The cohesion component of the 
transfers should also reinforce the equalizing effect of the system.  
The tests undertaken using data for 1991,1998 and 2002 confirmed the presence 
of the equalizing effect. They also confirm that this effect has been strengthened with 
the successive revisions of the law. 
Controlling for the two autonomous regions of Portugal one concludes that the 
equalizing effect is significantly stronger in the Azores but exhibits no difference in the 
case of Madeira. 
Using a proxi for per capita GDP instead of per capita own revenues produces 
equivalent results. 
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This paper was limited to the use of observations for three years. One possible 
extension is to use more years on the pooled version of the model. Estimates of GDP 
were only possible for on year (1998). It would be interesting to extend the exercise 
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TABLE A1 - Regression Results
ANOS
dep var
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 110 11 12 13 14 15 1
Constant 41,163 32,377 31,721 30,587 29,754 29,072 27,526 25,551 25,387 47,549 47,402 47,25 56,974 56,72 56,36 67
30,8 21,9 20,5 20,3 18,8 18,2 17,6 15,3 15,4 21,1 19,4 19,2 21,6 19,8 19,6 2
RECpc -0,315 -0,46 -0,438 -0,351 -0,322 -0,312 -0,165 -0,098 -0,88 -0,534 -0,529 -0,522 -0,583 -0,575 -0,561 0,
-5,8 -9,0 -8,3 -6,3 -5,6 -5,4 -2,1 -1,2 -1,1 -5,8 -5,5 -5,4 -6,4 -6,1 -5,9
D2000 21,606 21,428 22,329 22,131 22,934
12,3 12,2 12,7 12,6 13,0
D1998 13,654 13,561 14,195 14,101 14,769
7,9 7,872 8,2 8,159 8,5
DMadeira -4,626 -3,966 -0,0556 -1,449 -1,228 -6,204 -4,815 -4,907 2,418
-1,2 -1,1 -0,1 -0,3 -0,2 -0,9 -0,4 -0,6 0,2
DAçores 7,657 8,411 32,023 15,5 61,668 4,279 23,35 3,991 36,713
2,5 2,8 3,9 3,9 4,7 0,8 1,3 0,6 1,7
RECD2000 -0,000001 -0,000001 -0,0000014
-4,0 -4,1 -4,2




RecAçores -3,001 -8,82 -2,154 -3,436
-3,1 -3,7 -1,1 -1,5
RecMad -0,291 -0,018 -0,114 -0,458
-0,71 0,0 -0,1 -0,6
R2 0,035 0,173 0,179 0,191 0,197 0,204 0,012 0,055 0,09 0,096 0,095 0,093 0,116 0,113 0,115 0,
F 34,201 64,669 40,745 44,016 33,047 27,,38 4,616 6,858 7,012 33,141 11,601 7,182 40,921 13,88 8,893 66
sign. F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POOLED
TRpc
MODELS
TRpc
20021991
TRpc
1998
TRpc
